IPEMED – "Mediterranean 2030" foresight programme

Working Group Report on "Values"

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Summary

As part of the "Mediterranean2030" foresight programme, IPEMED, whose mission is to bring the two sides of the Mediterranean closer through economy, was confronted with a question raised mainly by leaders in the South: What values should be at the root of Euro-Mediterranean integration?

To respond to this delicate junction between economic and cultural approaches, the foresight programme set up a working group to focus on Euro-Mediterranean values. Its first task was to differentiate three distinct notions:

(i) the notion of value. This is a complex notion, and it is vital not to limit it to religion, nor to expand it to cover a disparate set of behaviour patterns (family, religion, politics, leisure, associations, etc.), nor to take a standardizing approach by assuming that western values represent a ready-to-use "kit" (based on a formula taken up by the working group: "democracy can be imported but not exported");

(ii) the notion of "collective preferences". Because nations increasingly find themselves having to cooperate with each other, this notion has been the subject of an increasing number of studies. This does not involve agreeing on a common, paramount and absolute positive value, but agreeing on our common *difficulties* in the face of a societal dilemma and deciding on a common way to respond. These societal dilemmas are mainly: the relationship with development (i.e. choice between short term and long term, between durability and transformation, or in other words the issue of time); the relationship between personal autonomy and collective cohesion (i.e. the issue of freedom); and the relationship with law (i.e. the issue of justice and especially the role played by the rule of law). These dilemmas are not restricted to the Mediterranean, but it is probably the capacity to define common collective preferences that will determine the most significant contours of tomorrow's international regions;

(iii) the notion of "vectors of mobilization". Identifying the founding values of a common region or the preferences for a draft region is one thing, setting them in motion is another. In twenty years' time, will there be a value that inhabitants throughout the region will be prepared to get into the streets to defend? It is important to pinpoint any silent forces that we may have not yet clearly identified. The so-called "invisible contract" approach used by the Stratorg company for Mediterranean 2030 offers a solution.

On a more sociological level, the working group also looked at the evolution of values in some of the region's countries. Two seminars focused on Tunisia and Morocco. They revealed a persistent strong attachment to collective values and especially family ones, *and* the rise of so-called modern values, like individuation (including in religious practice), that have characterized the evolution of European societies for at least the last three centuries. In both countries, politics was identified as a "weak link in collective values". This raises the question of investment in this area by those focusing on development if the rule of law is to become a shared collective preference for the region.

On a practical level, the invisible contract approach should be applied to other countries in the region. Another tack would be to appraise the different working groups looking at common values that have been launched by Euromed since 1995. The idea of a regular survey of the evolution of values in the regional area (a "Euro-Mediterranean barometer") might be worth looking into.

1. Introduction: the working group's objectives

Values are a difficult notion to grasp. They are interiorized but not always conscious or organized into an elaborate discourse, despite the fact that they guide the actions of people and social groups. They are often presented as obvious, e.g. through a national slogan like "liberté, égalité, fraternité" in France, but are not always put into practice or shared as much as we think. They are frequently presented as absolute and everlasting – yet they are dependent on history, social and economic progress and the cultures of individual countries, even individual communities. The difficulties are clearly even greater if we try to update or define the potential common values of an entire region like the Euro-Mediterranean.

1.1. No common foresight or regional integration without common values

Political decision-makers in the Mediterranean South have raised the question of which values would be at the foundation of a common region. This was confirmed at the first seminar of the "Mediterranean 20230" foresight programme on 21 April 2009, a programme launched by IPEMED and involving several Euro-Mediterranean and national forecasting organizations. If we do not tackle the issue of founding values, there can be no debate on the future of Euro-Mediterranean integration between programme participants, and it is even less likely to move in favour of regional integration.

The problem is that even though values are less absolute than we tend to think, they are only effective over time, existing both in the past and for the future. It is therefore difficult for new territories, like regions, to lay claim to common values.

To simplify things, we could therefore limit ourselves to those values shared by the inhabitants of a region, but in a non-exclusive way: not one or two values specifically common to the region, but broader values that inhabitants share with many other people around the world. But this would not necessarily make things any easier: the European experience, for example, shows that Europeans' values are far from comparable in every respect. The survey of European values that has been undertaken every ten years since 1980 shows a strong set of behaviour patterns relating to moral, political and religious attitudes, but also reveals lasting differences between Latin Europe, which is confrontational, still very hierarchical and lacking in confidence in itself and others, and the more consensual, egalitarian Northern Europe.

There is no survey available of this type for North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans, but there is little risk in stating that values are highly disparate from one part of the Euro-Mediterranean block to another. Since individual countries are often still consolidating their own national values (e.g. the Balkans, especially ex-Yugoslavia, the Lebanon, as well as Turkey which moved from its status as an imperial centre to that of a national state not so long ago, etc.), it is difficult to determine what the common values would be for all countries in the region.

We can clearly identify convergent behaviour patterns in inhabitants (e.g. more personal religious practice, increasing presence of nuclear families instead of extended families, convergence of demographic behaviour, dietary habits, democratic aspirations, etc.), but these are so broadly present throughout the world that it is hard to imagine that they might characterize – let alone mobilize – countries in the Euro-Mediterranean region as such. Moreover, do comparable behaviour patterns constitute common values?

1.2. Moving from "values" to "collective preferences"

One way of making progress could be to reason less in terms of "values" (which boil down to the immemorial fundaments of a social group) than in terms of "collective preferences" (strategic orientations over a much shorter period). Not the certitude of the foundations, then, but the choice for the future; not what concerns the founding absolute, but what creates pragmatic agreement on the lines of action for a given phase; not what determines and completely differentiates one people from others, but what can make it act with other peoples, possibly on a progressive scale, where each people retains its own foundations in any event. And perhaps, in the long run, these collective preferences could little by little constitute a set of new "common values".

When societies evolve, culture is the slowest to change (including values, or "ideology" as envisaged by Louis Dumont[1]), because it underlies everything. Two major phenomena nevertheless move the goal posts and create the need to define common values or preferences. The first of these is globalization, the increase in trade and the circulation of ideas, and therefore the confrontation of cultural systems. There is an inevitable "benchmarking" of cultural systems, whereby societies crudely compare the "efficiency" of their economic and social (and therefore cultural) systems. Cultural combination – "acculturation" in French, the process by which a cultural system absorbs elements from different systems – is bound to occur, just like the inevitable blending of physical features as the circulation of people is globalized.

The second phenomenon is the emergence of a territory that could be called the "fourth type", which is neither national, infra-national (local) nor global, but involves the regrouping of a set of countries into a major region, a trend initiated with the European Community[2]. The causes are for the most part economic, but the historical and geographical proximity of the countries concerned makes cultural integration easier and thus facilitates the constitution of a common cultural foundation necessary for integrated economic development.

We use the term "facilitates" rather than "brings about" because nothing is automatic in this area. Culture is a specific domain for which a person, group or country is ready to die because its fundamental essence is threatened. It is not only the area that makes all the rest possible and enables innovation *but also* the area of resistance and of what could only be changed as a last resort. Whether we are speaking of values or collective preferences, commitment to newness is therefore not simple and even less likely to be automatic. To activate it calls for what the working group described as "vectors of mobilization", taking up Stratorg's approach. Vectors of mobilization are events and performances which might be explicit or implicit (Stratorg speaks of the "hidden contract"), and which might, at a given moment and for a given area, cause values or collective preferences to mobilize inhabitants to follow a common path.

In Europe's case, the desire for peace after the Second World War constituted the vector of mobilization. Potentially common collective preferences were thus set to work, with the effect that standards of living and democratic aspirations continued converging during later expansions. In the Euro-Mediterranean case, what vectors of mobilization would be likely to mobilize societies, like the social contract linking each community of citizens within a nation state, making them stick together and act together?

1.3. Three objectives

The working group set itself three objectives. The first was to investigate, on a more theoretical level, the distinction between "values" and "collective preferences" (part 2). The second was to retrospectively assess the sociological evolution of values in several countries in the region over the last few decades, with the aim of identifying any converging values or at least behaviour patterns between the two sides of the Mediterranean (part 3). The third, more political, objective was to pinpoint potential "vectors of mobilization" that could take the region's collective preferences from the virtual towards something more operational (part 4).

The second part of the text takes up the material that served as a basis for the group's work and was added to during discussions at the different "Med 2030" seminars. The third part is the outcome of two meetings, one held in Tunis on 21 November 2009 at the invitation of ITES, and the other in Rabat on 24 February 2010 at the invitation of IRES. The fourth part provides the main results of the analyses undertaken by Stratorg during the "Med 2030" seminars and during a Breakfast Session organized by IPEMED on 7 May 2010 with Abderrahmane Hadj Nacer and Jean-Luc Fallou. Attendees of these various meetings, of whom there are many more than working group members, may not always recognize the order of their discussions, which we have reorganized in a more logical manner. We hope that they will recognize the essence of the ideas that animated the various discussions held during the year.

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[1] Louis Dumont calls ideology the system for portraying a society without any normative or critical connotation. See especially Dumont L., 1983, *Essais sur l'individualisme. Une perspective anthropologique sur l'idéologie moderne*, Le Seuil, Paris.
[2] Many other examples of extending political territories have existed throughout history, but this was the first time that such a large grouping took place through free, rather than military, will.

1.4. Follow-up

In a field as complex as the interface between culture and the economy, the working group understandably considers the present report as only a partial contribution and just one stage in an inevitably long process. The group is also aware that the text raises more questions than it gives operational answers.

We still need to make an analysis of what the Barcelona process has accomplished in the domain of values: what common values were implicitly or explicitly conveyed by the Barcelona process? Since 1995, what results have been achieved by the various working groups on values launched by Euromed? A number of consensuses have been institutionalized (in the 1995 Barcelona declaration or in the 2008 Paris summit declaration). Whatever the outcomes of these consensuses, what they have accomplished intellectually exists to be taken up again.

Participants at the seminars agreed that, although disagreements continue between countries in the region, they are not rooted in a civilization-based fracture between several conceptions of values, but rather in diverging interpretations of their implementation around major principles that are shared or comparable from one side of the Mediterranean to the other. The goal is therefore to work on the portrayal and evolution of values. A future stage of the work could be to set up a survey, perhaps even a regular consultation (or "barometer") to obtain a portrayal of collective preferences and common values from Euro-Mediterranean inhabitants, and measure how rapidly they converge – or diverge. The trend for opinion polls and barometers is spreading in SEMCs (see e.g. *The Arab Democracy Barometer*, *The Arab Network on Public Opinion Surveys* set up in Cairo, etc.), which makes the project conceivable. This of course goes far beyond the ambition of the present report.

2. Values and collective preferences

Here we resume the working group's discussions on the theoretical dimension of the notion of "values". These few pages do not attempt to make a precise description of the realities of each country in the region; the term "SEMC" happily lumps together all countries South and East of the Mediterranean, and "European countries" does the same for countries to the North, which would be enough to make any serious sociologist or anthropologist grimace. The aim of these preliminary analyses is only to set out the terms of discussion.

2.1. The problematic approach of the notion of "value"

There are three pitfalls to avoid in tackling the notion of "values":
- Reducing the issue to one of religion, which is a frequent reaction all over the Euro-Mediterranean and is an extreme simplification of the relationships between the Muslim "East" and the Christian or "Judeo-Christian" "West"[3]. Religion obviously enters into the cultural field and is one expression of value, but it does not fully answer the question.
- The second pitfall, conversely, would be to extend it to include issues as vague and varied as wellbeing, solidarity, identity, spirituality and so forth. This is what the *World Value Survey* does when it looks at values relating to the family, leisure, politics, religion, science and faith, the nation, neighbour relations and participation in group activities (e.g. sport, art, associations), etc. This is for instance the very large approach of the Anna Lindh Foundation's recent report on the Euro-Mediterranean cultural cooperation[4].
- The third pitfall would be to tackle the issue from a standardizing angle of what might be good or bad, which inevitably leads to ideological shortcuts – for example, considering all western vales as inherently good values to be generalized.

A first solution could lie in identifying those values that would find agreement throughout the region:

- This could be because they constitute strong Mediterranean features (memories and heritage, plurilingualism, cultural translation and interaction, etc.). However, we would still have to agree on what the Mediterranean heritage actually is, and – if the accent is on the tradition of cultural interaction in the Mediterranean – to agree on the conditions of its expression today, since how can we rely on cultural interaction when there is still no guarantee of free circulation for people?

- Or it could involve universal values (the fundamental needs of all human beings, like access to education and health, the need for general security for nations and individuals, recognition and mutual respect, the rule of law, etc.). But then nothing would really set the Mediterranean apart from other areas of the world; moreover, shared values are not necessarily mobilizing in the sense of a common project.

As for the option of adopting one single emblematic value, such as democracy, this can be weakened by the criticism it is generally subject to: i.e. a pseudo universal value that would be actually imposed by the West[5], a theoretically formal value that would disguise all sorts of

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[3] See especially the works of Georges Corm on historical reinterpretation, political manipulation of values and in particular religious values. For example: "Religion and geopolitics: a perverse relationship", conference given at the Andorra Principality Summer University, August 2009, polygr., Beirut, or "La notion historique d'Occident : une construction mythologique aux conséquences funestes", *Questions Internationales* n°41,2010, Paris.

[4] In the framework of the Foundation's working programme "Common road map for restoring trust in shared values", the report takes into account the following values or preferences: Curiosity, Obedience and religious beliefs, Attachment to spiritual and moral values, Independence, Family solidarity, Respect for the other cultures and cultural diversity, Mediterranean way of life and food, Common cultural heritage and history, Environmental challenge and respect, Hospitality, Creativity, Youth and social dynamism, Individual freedom and the rule of law, Social solidarity, Gender equality... (*The Anna Lindh Report, Euromed Intercultural Trends*, 2010).

[5] This criticism hails back to the "differentialist" trend, according to which there are natural differences between groups (i.e. genders, "races", peoples, species). This theory is the antithesis of abstract universalism, and advocates the recognition of a cultural heritage specific to each people that merits being preserved by political institutions. This trend took shape at a time when the concept of the nation in Europe was dividing, especially between France and Germany during the Napoleonic conquests: Herder and Fichte denounced the pretention of the Enlightenment's humanism to rebuild the world by making a clean sweep of tradition, refused the

necessarily discretionary practices, or an ideal value that would be unattainable for a developing country.

Additional difficulty arises because a distinction obviously has to be made between current values, and potential or desired values. Can we be sure, for example, that desired values such as democracy and rule of law are shared (who defines and chooses them: political leaders? Inhabitants, and if so how?), and can we be sure that they are the basis of strategic action? It is clearly easy to slip from a register of values to one of ideology or wishful thinking.

Lastly, when it comes to implementing these values, it is important to make a distinction between (i) "*institutional functions*" – which are fundamental and universal, like organizing power, justice, protection of the most vulnerable, secure transactions and contracts; and (ii) "*institutional arrangements*" – which are idiosyncratic responses that a particular society invents to satisfy, more or less, institutional functions. This distinction can be applied to values. Thus, concerning power, its *function* would be legitimacy, whereas responding by elections with universal suffrage would be an *arrangement* selected from other possible modes (throughout history many other modes have offered legitimate power). And we could go even further in distinguishing several modes of universal suffrage. This variety shows us that values are obviously ingrained in societies and that there is no question of formally exporting a ready-made "kit" of values (i.e. democracy in Iraq, resumed by Jacques Ould Aoudia in this neat formula: democracy can be imported but not exported.)

Indeed, we can agree on the practical mode of a value: when it comes to the legitimacy of power, we might imagine that inhabitants and leaders in every country in the Euro-Mediterranean region decide that the common future should be election by sincere and transparent universal suffrage. Of all of the modes guaranteeing the legitimacy of power, this is the one that they would choose to be common[6]. We are therefore coming closer to the notion of a "collective preference".

2.2. The notion of "collective preference"

This notion is the subject of an increasing number of studies, since nations find themselves having to cooperate with each other over the long term. A few years ago, the Economic Analysis Centre used this notion to analyze the challenges of world governance[7].

A "collective preference" supposes choosing from a certain number of domains at the foundation of living together in every society, wherever it may be. This does not mean agreeing with each other on a positive common value, but rather on our common *difficulties* in the face of a societal dilemma, and on choosing a common way (amongst other possible options) of responding.

It is worth underlining the difference between these two notions:
- A "value", defined by the past at the root of a particular society, is unique and absolute. It is a cardinal ideal determined by the past and that contemporary reality fulfils more or less perfectly;
- A "preference", defined by a project, is relative and can vary from one period to another, depending on evolution over time. It sets a course, but it is adjustable since, crucially, it is situated in relation to a societal dilemma. This dilemma might be common to several societies (major societal dilemmas are common to all societies), even if they are founded on different values. It is because it looks to the future and to action, avoids looking back to the absolute character of foundations, can mobilize societies with different histories and values, and because it highlights the common difficulties in facing up to societal challenges,

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Enlightenment's universalism in the name of cultural diversity, and contested civilization (singular) in the name of civilizations (plural).

[6] A position fairly close to that defended by Abderrahmane Hadj Nacer (cf. appendix 4), when he esteems that the common value between North and South must first and foremost be political and concern democracy and the state of law. In fact, the issue of renewing the national social contract converges, in different ways, with the issue of political power in each of the three countries in the Maghreb. In Tunisia, the strategic choice of basing the country's development on constituting a middle class has been successfully followed through; but what about their access to political leadership? In Algeria, the choice was to build an equal society; but once again, what about actual access to power, and how will equality be maintained with the reduction of oil resources? In Morocco, modernization has involved hyper-centralized top-level personal networks; in the era of the knowledge economy and user participation in development, how can this circle be enlarged?

[7] Jacquet, P., Pisani-Ferry, J., Tubiana, L., 2001, *Gouvernance mondiale*, report by the Economic Analysis Council (Conseil d'Analyse Economique), La Documentation Française, Paris.

that this notion of collective preference appears well suited to today's international governance.

Without aiming to be comprehensive, we might identify three of these societal dilemmas that are linked but that are worth differentiating for more clarity:

- the relationship with development (choice between short and long term, past and future, between durability and transformation – in other words the issue of *time*);
- the relationship between individual autonomy and collective cohesion (in other words the issue of *freedom*);
- the relationship with the law (what is the source of the law, what is the nature of the rule in the name of which the law is applied, how is equality guaranteed in regard to this rule – in other words the issue of *justice*).

These dilemmas are obviously not restricted to the Mediterranean. However, their terms are specific to each region, and in our own region there are specific responses for historical and cultural reasons (political and religious traditions, etc.). What differentiates, or will differentiate, international regions from each other will no doubt mostly be the way in which we will collectively be able to accept differences and collective preferences within each region and, perhaps, progressively compose several collective preferences for the region as a whole. *It is certainly this capacity to define common collective preferences that will determine the most significant contours of tomorrow's regions.*

2.2.1. The relationship with development: the issue of time

This issue principally relates to the short term and the long term:

- countries in the Mediterranean region are situated among thousand-year-old civilizations (like the Chinese), in contrast with the Americas and in particular the United States – the most recent country in history, which broke away from European political and cultural systems;
- that said, Europe increasingly appears to be directed (in any case more than the SEMCs) towards values of self-actualization and *short-term* development (individualism, the "Americanization" of societies and economic development choices, which could be put into question by the financial crisis);
- the state's place in society and the economy is proportional to the importance given to the long term, the state being the symbol and guarantee of what is established in the long term (a task that in practice it assumes to different degrees…).

It is also relates to the past and the future:

- the United States is the archetypal society founded on transformation, i.e. defined by the future that it *gives itself*. The advantage: permanent and generalized innovation; the disadvantage: the promethean risk of forgetting the fundaments of human history for the sake of adventures that are destructive in the long term (e.g. the USA's difficulty in taking on the principle of precaution);
- conversely, so-called traditional societies and/or those that give a central political place to religion as a collective (rather than individual) framework, favour references to the past, with society primarily conforming to its original fundamental values. The advantage: the feeling of certainty and the absence of risk from social or technological adventurousness; the disadvantage: a tendency to repeat and the difficulty to incorporate change.
- Mediterranean societies seem to constitute an intermediate group, attempting to bring together contradictory imperatives of long-lasting traditions and modern transformation – yet with a clear difference between the North (tending towards transformation) and the South (preferring the guarantees and immutability of convention).

Consequently, it is related to development priority:

- is the priority to maintain the social balance, or to transform goods, services, social relations, individual and family practices, in other words, innovation in every domain?
- Choices vary from one European country to another (Anglo-Saxon models: financialization of the economy vs. the continental, mainly Rhenish, model: long-term productive bases and sustainable development).

- Questions: Is the principle of precaution applied in the same way and in the same domains in the Mediterranean (impact of technological change on health and the environment, impact of sociological change on family structures, etc.)? Can the notion of sustainable development constitute a common basis for both sides of the Mediterranean?

2.2.2. The relationship between individual autonomy and collective cohesion: the issue of liberty

Given that the West has placed freedom at the heart of its ideology (in the meaning of system of values), sometimes to the point of worship, it is vital to reflect on this notion in terms of a dilemma and to stop taking a normative point of view which would establishe freedom as an absolute primacy and ignore the consequences of weakening the social link. Salim Kelala reminds us that, unlike western thinkers, for most Muslim thinkers justice may generate freedom but not the opposite. Similarly, there is no question of affirming the absolute primacy of the collective good at the price of sacrificing personal aspirations.

Secondly, if we want to work together on the difficult dilemma of freedom and submission to law, we should not start with religion. The Mediterranean is obviously the region of the "people of the Book", where the principle of monotheism is a source of symbolic law and individuals submit themselves to a higher transcendence. Yet not only has this principle spread throughout many other regions in the world, but monotheism is not the only philosophical-religious principle to set limits on individuals (e.g. Asian value systems).

Lastly, it is important to observe that this dilemma between freedom and cohesion occurs on three very different levels:
- the level of the individual (here the issue is the relationship between self-actualization / and limitation of individual supremacy by family and social constraints);
- the level of national society (relationship between the freedom of individuals or groups / and the need for collective cohesion, or in other words the issues of social contract and democracy);
- the level of the country in the international area (relationship between independence / and interdependence and, especially, regional integration, or in other words the issue of partial transfers of sovereignty).

Euro-Mediterranean regional integration does not concern the individual level, which is mainly related to national cultural, and often infra-national, traditions (local, family and religious, etc.). It does concern national society and international levels.

(i) National level (relationship between individuals / communities, or the issue of democracy)

Each side of the Mediterranean has established its settings: the North rather leans towards individual freedom, and the South towards collective conventions (religious, social or political). But the debate crosses over into European societies (e.g. a return to authority to deal with individuals' refusal of limitation), and can set European countries in opposition with each other. Moreover, in Europe, the financial crisis has re-legitimized the return of the state, whose role has generally remained a lot stronger than in the United States.

In the South, the challenge might be described as follows: Either move the settings towards individual freedoms, bringing into question the normative political systems legitimized in the name of collective cohesion (a legacy from the era of decolonization, when it was essential to construct a strong national entity). Or, maintain the settings towards limiting individuals in the name of collective cohesion, and perhaps even replace the political normative system with a religious system (fundamentalism), or affirming a community that goes beyond the idea of a nation state (a Muslim or Arabic Ummah), even though the constitution of a citizens' society unified by national convention and values is sometimes not yet assured. As in the North, the solution can vary from one SEMC to another.

To use the terminology of Louis Dumont, democracy is the ideology of societies that have given individuals pre-eminence over communities[8]. Historically, this ideology gained its current dimension

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[8] We insist on pre-eminence and not substitution. We are not talking about a polar analysis that would identify a cardinal, absolute value in individuals, but an analysis that reasons in terms of *dilemmas* within which the

with the nation state, giving shape to modern western democracies, wherein the "sovereign people" are the people *of one nation*. The exceptional success of western countries – where the individual is pre-eminent over the community, resulting in a preference for a shorter timescale (the length of a man's life) rather than the long timescale of civilizations, and for innovation rather than repetition – has built up western democracy as the de facto worldwide model. The resulting two problems are well known: limiting sometimes all-powerful individuals in the West; and the difficulty of moving from democracy to a broader entity than the nation state (e.g. the democratic deficit of the European Union, or the difficulty of envisaging a region in partnership with insufficiently democratic South Mediterranean countries).

(ii) International level (issue of international solidarity and transfer of sovereignty)

If we manage to present the dilemma between freedom / collective good in a dynamic (rather than normative) way within nations, we will be better equipped to respond to the issue at regional level, which could result in:

- partially limiting states' freedom through certain elements of Euro-Mediterranean supranationality (just as European states accepted to do through European Community);
- taking a stand for regional preference, especially in relation to trade agreements with the USA and Asia;
- accepting budgetary solidarity (expansion to the South of the second pillar of the CAP and thus contribution from European taxpayers towards rural development in the South, etc.);
- embarking on the road to interdependence, even for security (civil, food, energy, police, perhaps even military security?).

In comparison, neither the United States, Japan nor China appear prepared to make a move towards reducing their national independence[9]. The Mediterranean has an advantage for achieving interdependence: the European experience, a unique example of the voluntary partial transfer of national sovereignty.

2.2.3. The relationship to the law: the issue of justice

Justice is defined according to the content of a rule (substantial definition), the source of a rule (teleological definition, which concerns the origin and so the finality), and the way a rule is administered (procedural definition).

The source of a rule brings up the question of the state and the role of private stakeholders, and more generally, the question of moving from a single source to a hybrid, or even plural, source of law:

- The source of law could be religious (e.g. sacred texts, churches), political (the state), or social (family or social groups, which are highly prevalent in the Mediterranean wherever the state has not managed to impose the legitimacy of its *ultima ratio*).

- The history of European societies has resulted in political autonomy in relation to the religious and clannish (communities), with the state being the unique source of a law that is itself unified (family law is subject to general law, which is not the case in the South bar some exceptions like Tunisia).

- SEMCs have a long tradition of the state, but not all of them (e.g. the problem of Lebanon), and the credibility of the state as a source of law is not guaranteed everywhere (competition of normativities between the political and the religious, with some movements in such societies campaigning for religious pre-eminence; the difficulty of thinking of law as an autonomous and historicized authority and not revealed and set by the tradition of the "*Fiqh*"; the slowness of modernizing the legal system based on the state as a source of law).

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settings could either be situated nearer to individuals or to communities. This is the approach taken by Louis Dumont when he describes the dialectics between Individualism and Holism.

[9] A position that countries like China and India strongly underlined during the Copenhagen 2009 Climate Conference, when they refused any outside control of GHG on their own territory.

- While the state has not imposed its legitimacy everywhere, globalization has given a new challenge to its *auctoritas*. Intermixing sources of law, and especially hard law (written law with an immediately binding value issued from a unified source) and soft law (large number of norms and standards that are not necessarily binding and whose origin can be private, like company behaviour codes) is developing on an international scale, and also penetrating nations – where it can lend force to local or community normative action.

    o This intermixing brings into question the source of law as a *single* source, with several sensitive consequences: a necessary but complicated link between private and public sources of law; or refusal by (especially religious) defenders of a single, perhaps even "pure", source of law. Here we are moving (often with difficulty) from the idea of government as the single executor of a single rule, to "governance" that gathers a variety of decision-makers around a composite rule.

    o But this hybridization also opens up the normative zone to new national cooperation, involving interaction between the state and "civil society"[10]; as well as international cooperation, involving global or regional regulations. As pointed out by the Moroccan historian Abdeslam Cheddadi during the Rabat seminar, this hybridization is an essential notion if we are to avoid a simplified, civilization-based vision of human groups, defined once and for all by several values derived from a single source. Not only can we never truly define "civilization", but the term itself should be used with caution, given the weight now wielded by cultural integration and interaction. Even "alliance of civilizations" is a questionable term, the real keys being circulation, coexistence in a group or even in a single person of values derived from numerous sources, and cultural combination.

The substantial dimension of justice raises the question of legal equality:

- this substantial dimension of justice brings up the difficult issue of the relationship between what is Fair and what is Good, which leads us to the nature of the norm (which itself leads us to the relationship with time and the conflict between tradition and innovation). Nevertheless, a substantial domain of justice exists in which we might imagine arriving at a set of common Euro-Mediterranean preferences: the role of equality in national societies' organization of values (an operational continuation can be imagined: access to all essential services, etc.). Equality is highly variable from one country to another, although there is no particular difference between North and South, except for one vital aspect relating to the status of the individual: gender equality;

- in Europe, the new face of inequality can be found in the social realities of some EU member states that favour competition rather than the pre-eminence of equality (liberal countries like the UK), or in increasing socio-ethnic segregation;

- the question is: Is a convergence between the substantial concept of justice necessary to regional integration? From this point of view, could a choice to limit inequalities constitute a common foundation? If so, what should the priority be: reducing inequalities between *countries* (e.g. the North-South divide when it comes to economics, health, etc.); reducing inequalities between *individuals* and in particular men and women in each country; or reducing inequalities between individuals based on their *religion* (e.g. rejection of Islam in Europe[11] or the pushing out of Jews and now Christians in the Arabic Middle East)?

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[10] This acceptance of diversifying the source of norms and standards is reflected in the political domain: the (progressive) acceptance of diversifying governance, i.e. pluralism. But there is many a slip twixt the cup and the lip: according to the last UNDP report on human development in Arabic countries (2009), although all these countries support the right to constitute civil associations, most legal regimes and regulations governing civil society include a great many restrictive measures that limit exercising this right. Moreover, the report points out that the influence of the executive over the judiciary is still great, which narrows any differentiation between decision and execution of the legal norm.

[11] The cultural approach is an area still largely to be explored in the South, as well as in the North: The European language charter has still not been ratified by all countries, including France; according to Ahmed Boukous, the place of Arabic is still not fully established, which does nothing to help the sorry state of teaching Arabic in French schools.

Lastly, the procedural dimension raises the question of a state under the rule of law:

- Two ideal-typical principles oppose each other:
    - the rule exists in itself (with either a civil or religious source), is explicit and formal, in which case the legal process consists in referring to the tools or people that serve as functional executants of the rule. Taken to the extreme, this can reduce the legal process to the automatic execution of a code (which can lead to bureaucratic excesses, a good example of which is the European Commission's sometimes caricatural procedural processes), or result in the kind of widespread litigiousness found in the USA;
    - alternatively, a large proportion of the rule can be implicit, necessarily involving people to interpret and substantiate it. Taken to the extreme, this can reduce the legal process to the arbitrary choices of a clan leader based on interpersonal relationships that create a social order founded on "loyalty" rather than "legality"[12].

- In other words: legality would mean a rule applied uniformly, transparently and independently from the people responsible for it (who are simple executors); and "loyalty", a rule based on influential, or even dependent, interpersonal relations that are sometimes arbitrary. Every country has both of these types, but in different proportions: European countries have made the rule of law – a law whose source is the state (what we call a state under rule of law) – an imperative placed high in the ideological system and on the political agenda. SEMCs retain a strong interpersonal dimension, even though this varies from one country to another.

- Given the upheaval resulting from intermixing the source of law and thus the debates on the substantial dimension of justice, the question tends to focus on the procedural dimension made popular by the works of Rawls[13], and reinforced by the practical realities of operating the EU; the difference between the North (legality) and South (loyalty) thus becomes a real problem.

- A second general consideration is that the formalized rule (legality) characterizes generally more economically developed countries, and tends to impose itself as a model. The state as a source of law associated with formal legality as a way of administering law, in other words a state under the rule of law, appears likely to become the norm in the region as a whole. How quickly will SEMCs place it at the heart of their value system? Does actual convergence in this domain constitute the condition for regional integration? In this case, up to what point does the formalization of the functions and systematic application of rules independent from concrete social conditions ("institutional arrangements") delegitimize the rules incarnated by interpersonal relations? (Note that a certain Mediterranean tradition could be considered to be the prevalence of "human realities" over abstract legal principles.) Suggested by Salim Kelala during the Tunis seminar, could the notion of "fairness" (**XXX what is the term in Arabic?[14]**) constitute the middle road between an over-procedural application and an overly interpersonal approach to the law?

Do the responses to these three dilemmas, involving time, freedom and justice, show a tendency to converge between countries in the region, or to diverge? This type of decision cannot predict the regional political decision that could be taken in such a domain, for example if Euro-Mediterranean leaders were to put sustainable development at the heart of their common strategy[15]. However, it

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[12] On this distinction between rules based on "loyalty" or "legality", see the works of Jacques Ould Aoudia looking at the notion of good governance.

[13] Published in the 1970s, John Rawls' social contract theory has had a considerable impact on the contemporary conception of justice. Rawls understood justice as fairness in the process of choosing the principles of justice. He saw justice as related *in fine* to the welfare of the community; less directly linked with Good or any other external moral criterion than with the social context in which the principles of justice are drawn up; it resides in particular in the way in which these choices are made. This approach puts the procedural dimension of justice on a higher level than its substantial dimension, since its substance is relative to a given society.

[14] The term "fair policy" is one of the most commonly used in Arabic political literature.

[15] This strategic orientation would make sense, even over and above the fashion for sustainable development. This is partly because a predatory economy characterizes a portion of the North's economic activity (European banks bought the most "rotten" assets from the United States) as well as the South's (rent economy); and partly because the pressure on fragile natural resources (water and arable land) is higher than in any other region in the world. Another factor is that cultures on both sides value the long term (history spanning

would be easier to make the decision if there were a trend for converging preferences and behaviour on both sides of the Mediterranean.

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thousands of years, heritage, etc.). This kind of collective preference tends to promote moderation, both of personal consumption ("kana'a") and joint consumption (new buildings, promotion of transport systems emitting low-GHGs, compact towns, etc.); priority of demand management (for water and energy); health prevention and environmental protection; and the promotion of heritage (of cuisine and territories, using Geographical Indications, etc.).

3. Evolution of national values: case studies (Morocco and Tunisia) and debate

3.1. Extent and limits of "changing values"

Juan Diez Nicolas, who is Professor of sociology at Complutense University in Madrid, commented during the Rabat seminar on the increasing numbers of values surveys undertaken over the last fifteen years. Inspired by the work of political scientist Professor Ronald Inglehart, director of the *World Values Survey*[16], the "changing values theory" has been a driving force in the vogue for world surveys on values since the 1990s. Increasing numbers of world, European and national surveys (e.g. a third is already underway for Morocco) have been produced on religious issues, secularization and the "loss of values".

Underlying changing values focuses on religious values decline. Authority (in religion, as well as in families and at school) was central at the time of the industrial revolution, but has been counterbalanced by the rising emphasis on personal success and quality of life. Personal wellbeing, which typifies post-industrial society, has risen in proportion with authority's decline, and the regard for expressing subjectivity (i.e. self-assertion and claim for identity) has overtaken traditional concerns of material subsistence.

Inglehart has drawn up a cultural world map of national values: moral values are divided according to their traditional or modern character, and economic values according to their material (subsistence) or "post-material" character. The point of this approach is clearly to measure the moving domain of national values. The Inglehart theory also makes an important contribution to the "Mediterranean 2030" programme in showing the importance of *economic* change in cultural transition[17]. In the same way as in Europe, but less quickly since their economic growth is quantitatively lower, SEMCs' middle and higher classes[18] are starting to integrate modern values: participation in public life, assertion of identity, personal success, female rights, etc.

However, this theory has three limits:

(i) as we stated at the start of this paper, since value categories are extremely numerous, how can a country, not to mention a region, recognize itself in such a long list? The categories are not just numerous, but also arguable: "religion" is often considered in an overly general and dominant way in culture; putting values into "traditional" and "modern" groups is always too simplistic (Hassan Rachik reminds us that a so-called traditional society is an ideal-type and not a concrete society, and that, for example, there is a great deal of rationality in the way that traditional Moroccan societies manage water); lastly, country groupings (especially the label "Islamic civilization countries") should be handled with caution;

(ii) there is insufficient emphasis on social differentiations within each country (see especially the gap between what the elite and the rest of the population have in mind), the theory's main concern being to draw up a map differentiating the *countries*;

(iii) one way of using this map of values, especially if the evolution of values is not properly taken into account, could thus be in characterizing blocks of countries, with a closer interpretation of an absolute differentiation between "civilizations" as Samuel Huntington sees them, rather than a careful analysis of the transformations at work. Juan Diez Nicolas calls for the use of hindsight: the transition of values, opposition between young and old, rural and urban dwellers, etc. occurred in Europe several decades ago and is currently taking place in SECMs. Without hindsight, we easily risk, for example, missing an interesting change since 2000: the return to the notions of authority and security, whether personal (via welfare) or economic, that can be observed in a great number of different countries, and

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[16] Network of scientists that carries out surveys in about one hundred societies on wellbeing and values.
[17] This is the point of view of Abderrahim El Maslhoui, Professor of economics at the University Mohammed V, Rabat Agdal.
[18] That said, the increasing cultural and economic tropism of elites in SEMCs towards the Gulf and North America complicates the issue of Euro-Mediterranean convergence. See appendix 5, where Charles Abdallah shows how cultural, social and political models in SEMCs, and especially Mashriq countries, are far removed from Europe.

especially among their elites. As another example, when Muslim countries were asked, "How important is God in your life?" their answers were rated 9, compared to 5 for Europe – followers of Huntington would be pleased[19]; however, Moroccan immigrants in Spain rated the question at 7, which indicates a degree of cultural integration rather than a fixed characteristic that differentiates "civilizations" once and for all; also, national Moroccan and Tunisian surveys clearly show that religious practice itself is moving in a more personal direction.

3.2. Evolution of values in Tunisia

During the Tunis seminar, Mustapha Nasraoui, professor of sociology and President of the University of Jendouba, summed up recent work done in Tunisia on the evolution of national values (cf. appendix 2).

The four surveys on young people undertaken by the National Youth Observatory, the Ministry for Public Health, the Ministry for Economic Development and the National Office for the Family and Inhabitants, show that community values endure, with priority given to the family rather than the state (which can be said for many European countries). According to the National Institute for Public Health, 88% of children of the over-65s live a few minutes away from their families, often in the same neighbourhood or even on the next floor of a building. The importance of protecting the elderly (putting an old relation into a nursing home is considered dishonourable) and providing for the young unemployed, plus the widespread phenomenon of the family business, illustrate just how important the family is.

Yet nuclear families are also increasingly commonplace (along with the accompanying inter-generational tensions), and values of autonomy are making rapid progress (e.g. drop in the importance of age and birthright, generalized monogamy). Another sign of the rise of the individual is the new focus on consumerism: increasingly, moderation is no longer perceived as a value but as a sign of social failure, with consumption becoming a sign of success. On a religious level, there is still an overall, strong reference to Islam but, on the other hand, influences from other cultures are spreading, with the attraction of different environments and countries kindling the desire to emigrate. Put simply, the single rule is being replaced by a whole variety of references.

All in all, considers Professor Nasraoui, it is not a revolution of values that is taking place, but an evolution of values. The majority of Tunisians identify both with traditional values *and* new values, in other words, they are neither closed-in conservatives nor die-hard revolutionaries. The information revolution is accelerating this transformation, in a way that is hard to predict.

3.3. Evolution of values in Morocco

As Director general of the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies (IRES), the vocation of which is to inform public policy, Mohammed Tawfic Mouline reminds us that values are at the heart of a number of IRES's programmes: on social bonds, competitiveness (in general rather than just the economy), Morocco's place in globalization and especially its relationship to European standards, climate change. Moreover, Moroccan leaders judged the values question to be so important that they launched a national survey on the issue as part of the events organized to mark the country's fiftieth independence anniversary in 2004. The main lessons learned follow.

3.3.1. Results of the 2004 national Moroccan survey on values

The sample group involved over 1,000 respondents spread over the kingdom's fourteen regions. Like in the Mediterranean region in general, the family bond is still the most valued, and like Tunisia and the North, changes are taking place linked to individualism and autonomy of family members (e.g. development of the nuclear family, freer choice of marriage partner, more dialogue between parents and their children, etc.).

Religion is still a key factor in Moroccan values. Yet here too, there have been striking transformations. Religion is tending to become more personal and direct and to move away from

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[19] That said, respondents in the US rated 8!

traditional institutional mediation. The political bond is the weakest collective bond, with a low level of membership of political organizations. That said, involvement in associations and civil society is on the rise. Lastly, work and leisure activities are highly valued, making up the second group of values after the family. The role of television is established, and travel is clearly attractive, with the desire to emigrate frequently mentioned (one third of respondents) even though rarely followed through.

Two overall notions stand out: the free access to information, which encourages personal autonomy and, consequently, diverse and heterogeneous references; and the growing differentiation between "traditional" values (e.g. marital obedience, corporal punishment of children, polygamy…) and "modern" values (e.g. dialogue, autonomy, civil society…).

3.3.2. Other Moroccan studies on values

Hassan Rachik, who is an anthropologist, Professor at Casablanca's Hassan II University and a member of the scientific steering committee of IRES's "social bond" programme, completes the analysis with a survey of studies and polls on values in Morocco.

Since the 1990s, several surveys have directly or indirectly focused on values: young people and values (1995, pupils and students in Rabat), the 2004 national survey, and the 2007 survey on religious values. In total, around ten quantitative surveys made over the last dozen years in particular, constitute important material, not to mention a large number of private initiatives. We can conclude that leaders and inhabitants are interested in the issue of values, proving that values are changing and raising questions.

All of these studies confirm that the family represents a refuge institution and is the most valued, even though surveys do not make explicit the reasons: Ethical? Religious? The family is also the stage where transformations and conflicts of values are played out, especially sexual issues, giving paradoxical results, e.g. the comparison between marital obedience (three quarters of responses say women obey their husbands) *and* the importance of dialogue (between parents and children, etc.); or between solidarity of the extended family *and* the autonomy of the couple, which is a rising value.

The surveys also confirm that the continued central focus on religion – which all too easily presents the societies of countries in the South like Morocco as radically different from the individualist and non-religious societies that make up Europe – disguises increasingly personal religious practices including, surprisingly, in the countryside, where socio-economic life is yet still based on the group. Regarding religious information, the individualism of practices is once again striking: the explosion of the media gives practising Muslims freer access to the religious information and values "market", even though there are still too few studies on Moroccans' reception of satellite chains broadcasting religious programmes. This diversification of substantial references weakens the religious content: knowledge of dogma is generally low, even though religious practice remains high. We can see why religion is placed beneath the family as a value. We can also see why the state is obliged to renounce controlling information and the dissemination of values; rather than putting forward a single reference, the state has to restrict itself to regulating this increasingly diversified market.

They also confirm that political values (parties and unions, etc.) come low on the list, with only 3% or 4% of respondents claiming political membership. Practices like demonstrations generally represent less than 15% of answers. These political values, whether they involve knowledge of public institutions or the personal interest they arouse, appear as a genuine "weak link for values"; between 20% and 50% of respondents did not even express an opinion on the question.

Three overall ideas emerge from this survey. The first is that the state and political values in general occupy a much smaller place than in the North of the Mediterranean. Secondly, even though recent changes raise certain questions, the personal/community relationship is more heavily weighted towards the community than in Europe (e.g. subsistence of marriage values, wifely obedience, family solidarity, etc.). The third, conversely, indicates North-South convergence, with a rise in personal values (which Moroccan analysts lump together under the term "modernist"): progression of the limited family, the autonomy of couples and children, women working outside the house and male-female equality (except in politics); the rapid drop in polygamy, in the extended family and early marriage, especially for young men. Another factor that leans in the direction of North-South convergence, but which needs backing up, is the

diminished importance of the "given word", or promise – perhaps a sign of a drop in loyalty-based rules?

3.4. The main points of the debate

3.4.1. Transformation of national values and convergence between North and South countries

The contrast between "modernist" and "traditionalist" values is, of course, simplistic, yet it does have the merit of showing the main lines of transformation. In the South, this frame of reference (the progression of modernist values) describes the rudiments. In Mauritania, no surveys are available, but several major features stand out (Mohamed Ould Abba): increasing openness to the outside (particularly the role of television) and thus a diversification of value sources, an increasing convergence (with Europe and other North African countries) in a certain number of behaviour patterns, like the age of marriage and fertility, and a clear promotion of what might be called "practical values".

Regarding the weak political bond shown in Moroccan values, it is important not to confuse a weak bond with a lack of interest. The long time political constraint that existed in countries like Morocco, probably goes a long way to explain the lack of credibility of this value, although this does not mean that Moroccans are not interested in this domain (Salam Kawakibi).

As to religion as a source of law, secularism has not really been proposed and discussed by the various Moroccan and Tunisian surveys; that said, even though it is not recognized in principle, secularism is becoming a reality in both countries (where only the king embodies religious and political power). In Morocco, there is concurrent demand for the separation of politics and religion *and* the promotion of moral values coming from religion.

Regarding the international convergence of values and the global value "supermarket", Abdesselam Cheddadi esteems that although it cannot influence the definition of global values, Morocco should be entitled to make its own contribution to the global stage, for instance when it comes to moral values – which were invented in Europe (e.g. freedom); and also to aesthetic standards such as design and the conception of dominant objects (those of the West again). However, culture is a weak point in countries in the South like Morocco; if they are not capable of defining it, they will wield even less weight on the international scene. For the time being, Morocco's image essentially comes down to how it is perceived by the dominant countries.

Habib Lazreg considers that looking at national values in such detail probably takes us away from regional debate, which requires identifying a small number of common values. Every culture has its own values and convergence only tends to impoverish them. The challenge is to identify the very few that could serve as a common regional foundation. We thus need to take a closer look at what, in the rich history of exchange between North and South, has preserved common values – which are there even if we are not necessarily capable of identifying them.

Dominique Bocquet on the other hand, sees a strong link between the strength of local (national) values and the capacity to open up to the outside. The amount of work done on Moroccan values does not complicate the country's international openness, it makes it possible, because the stronger identity becomes, the easier it is to open out to others. The case of Brittany is a good example: a strong identity (e.g. language) was favourable to economic development as well as to national and international economic integration; it made it easier to resist false solutions (e.g. racism and the rejection of the EU), to elect immigrants (i.e. the Franco-Togolese Kofi Yamgnane was MP for the Finistère and secretary of state), and to unite in a multi-party Breton front for negotiating in Paris.

4.3.2. Euro-Mediterranean values

Jean-Louis Guigou reminds us that two contradictory movements are at work: one is the homogenizing effect of globalization (e.g. a world car, the same towns everywhere etc.) and local or religious identity-based reactions. The other is the creation of major regional groupings (Europe from the 1950s, East Asia, NAFTA and in the future perhaps the Euro-Mediterranean, without which

the North will decline and the South will be in "confetti"[20]). If the Mediterranean is to make a genuine regional response to globalization, should we listen to Marx, for whom the economy leads the world and determines production and trade standards, or should we believe that material does not work on its own and that cultural issues are inevitable? Inglehart's approach, which involves crossing values' economic and cultural dimensions, appears fruitful; but who will be the main deciders of Euro-Mediterranean norms – the states? Would it not be better to let civil society have its say? Should we hope for common values to emerge, or more pragmatically, limit ourselves to a convergence of procedural norms between the two sides?

For Hassan Benabderrazik, the best option is the pragmatic ambition of converging norms. The key for the region is to get inhabitants and societies to coexist with values that are neither transcendent nor based on identity, and with different values for individual societies when it comes to the family, sexuality, religion, etc. If the Union for the Mediterranean is to advance on a practical level, the issue is not to construct a general convergence of values, but rather the conditions for coexisting with different values. We have made progress in this domain with the lessons of Rawls and Habermas: rules based on a normative, procedural system that could be summed up as the rule of law, which needs to be generalized if such coexistence is to take place[21]. For him, the problem is that in the field of joint action, SEMC stakeholders have invested little in this rule of law. Seminar presentations have focused on family or religious values, which are highly identity-based and ritualistic, but have said little of the political domain, even though this is where the collective rule is constructed. We therefore need to work together on this domain.

This kind of reduction of the political is arguable, according to Abdesselam Cheddadi, because values are not independent from each other: it is the hierarchy of values that is significant. But the North and South of the Mediterranean are perfectly likely to have parallel values, different ways of embodying them, and different hierarchies. He adds that the UfM is a European initiative and that dialogue is imbalanced since the EU is well defined, but SEMCs are not coordinated between each other. He says the term "union" disguises power relationships, including in the domain of values and norms. If a true partnership is to be formed, the values of parity and reciprocity are crucial, even if they do not yet exist.

Discussions therefore focused on three potential approaches to the issue of Euro-Mediterranean values:
- a thorough approach looking at every value domain (politics, family, religion, etc.), their hierarchy, the ways in which they come up against the practices of each society and the history of their confrontation in the Mediterranean area[22] – i.e. an *academic* approach;
- a selection of several major procedural preferences centred on joint action, such as the rule of law – i.e. a *technocratic approach*;
- identification of one or two "vectors of mobilization" (see part 4) capable of mobilizing inhabitants on both sides of the Mediterranean – i.e. a *political* approach.

These approaches are complementary (Rachik), but although we can simplify matters by pinpointing vectors of mobilization (OK for Stratorg's "hidden contract": a rough sketch can be useful even though it is less precise than a good map), we still need to target a set of values rather than one single value. Moreover, if we identify a "vector of mobilization" as "what gets people out into the street" (the formula suggested by Jean-Luc Fallou and Jean-Louis Guigou), we must not forget that the culture of contest is not the same in North and South.

The question of an invisible contract is interesting and stimulating. Let us move forward on this path; and if we cannot ultimately pinpoint any common values, it will prove that we need to work together to create them (Faouzi Squalli).

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[20] India and China's share in global GDP has risen from 3% in 1990 to 12% today and could reach 25% by 2030. These are not countries joining the rich countries' club, but rather countries that draw up a new model. They will remain relatively poor, which is new, and will behave differently from rich countries (e.g. the climate issue).

[21] See the annual report of the ARI (Arab Reform Initiative) on the state of reform in the Arab world (*The State of Reform in the Arab World 2009-2010*). The report focuses on the transition towards democracy, measured by four values or fundamental principles (quality and transparency of public institutions, respect for rights and freedoms, rule of law, social justice) using about forty indicators. The quantitative and qualitative data come from varied sources: legal and legislative texts, opinion polls and the state of public opinion, government practices and decisions of the executive.

[22] This is notably the viewpoint of Mustapha Taleb El Khalfi (Centre marocain des études et recherches contemporaines).

We can certainly identify some common mobilizing values using simple, unrefined methods, yet there are many ways of measuring the "temperature", so we should not be afraid of using different methods (Diez Nicolas). We also have to agree on the actual terms, since "governance", "freedoms", etc. do not necessarily mean the same thing in North and South (Cheddadi).

The invisible contract method is definitely not scientific, the samples are not representative, nor are the categories perfectly clear, but the good side of this method is that it presents the problem and constitutes a first step of what may later become a detailed survey (Eurobarometer-style, says Pierre Beckouche). The "invisible contract" method proposed is a preliminary task. Let us accept it and decide later how we can take it further together (Benjelloun).

Other methodological tacks were suggested:
- the Barcelona partnership was basically fairly successful on values (much more than on economics): human rights, the status of women, etc., even though there is obviously some major resistance. We need to appraise this convergence (Fouad Ammor).
- We could also pinpoint those values that show a North-South divergence; we could start with problematic issues rather than common values, then measure how those differences evolve (convergence or divergence, Cheddadi).

4. Vectors of mobilization: getting societies moving

Identifying the values that form the basis of a common region or the preferences for a draft region is one thing; getting them moving is another. The values of a society need catalysts to move from slow transformation to the surge without which a political project cannot easily take shape. In the history of the EU's construction, the catalysts lay in the transformation of fears into a mobilizing utopia. Today, the arrival of globalization has brought back strong fears in both North and South.

4.1. Past fears and mobilizations

In the case of Europe, we might consider that different fears like war, Communism or the loss of power in the globe (following the end of the colonial empires, the rise of the United States and more recently of the major emerging powers) led to the mobilization of the European project. This conditioned economic development, social cohesion and even a certain political ambition (maintaining European countries' role on the international scene).

In the south and east Mediterranean, we might consider that fears of domestic political instability, social and cultural dilution (the threat of western values and the refusal of a "convergence of civilizations", the threat of European post-colonial power?), and the fear of global marginalization, have led to both the creation of modern nation-states and attempts at broader regional union (pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic, Maghrebi with the AMU). But these expansions have not succeeded, and SEMCs remain too isolated to respond to growing fears.

Can the south Mediterranean conceive that it could regain its global ranking not "against the North" but with it, despite the fact that it tends to see its decline as at least partly caused by the North's desire to dominate it? Can Europe conceive that a portion, or even a majority, of the solutions to the challenges it faces reside in regional integration with SEMCs, which it views as economically and politically under-developed?

In any event, North and South Mediterranean share several fears:

-   fear of climate change (North and South)
-   fear of after-oil (North and South)
-   fear of food shortages (South), fear of health and environment risks from the current food industry (North and South)
-   fear of others (North and South: invasion by immigration, perversion of values, etc.)
-   fear of global marginalization compared with other world regions (North and South).

It is not just fears and their transformation into a mobilizing utopia that can serve as a catalyst to the region. A resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict would in itself constitute the most powerful catalyst possible.

Overall, the question raised is as follows: in the name of what values (negative: fears, or positive) would Euro-Mediterranean societies be ready to rally together and build a common future?

4.2. Stratorg's "invisible contract" approach

The invisible contract unites an entire society – families, companies, the nation – without us sometimes even being aware of it. This contract shows for what we are ready to mobilize ourselves at the highest level, individually and collectively; the thing that we are not ready to give up at any price.

Within a company, this factor can explain why a merger between two companies succeeds or fails. Identifying the invisible contract does not involve looking at the values expounded by the company, but at the behaviour patterns observed within it. Everything relies on the principle that values do not truly exist unless they can be proved by behaviour. In this sense, core values are those that get people moving. And if these deep-seated values diverge too much between two companies, their merger will result in failure.

Transposed onto a national or regional framework, the core values of an invisible contract can be identified by observing the strongest behavioural reactions when these values are threatened. The core value for France, for example, would probably be equality (the most virulent demonstrations

are always centred on a threat to equality), for the United States it would be freedom (freedom of enterprise lies at the root of the federation of original colonies), and in Europe it would be peace (see the demonstrations against war in Iraq).

For the Mediterranean, the question becomes: what invisible contract will unite Mediterranean inhabitants in twenty years' time? In other words, in twenty years, will there be a value that people across the region will be prepared to get out into the streets to defend if it is threatened? This involves identifying discreet tendencies that are possibly not yet clearly visible. Perhaps nothing of this kind exists; perhaps something is in the process of emerging. The methodology used by the Stratorg company as part of the "Mediterranean 2030" programme tackles this issue.

During the programme's various seminars (Marne-la-Vallée, Tunis and Rabat), this methodology was proposed to participants. They took part in an interactive exercise of ranking values that might form the basis of a "Mediterranean invisible contract", guided by a Stratorg representative. The first show of hands and vote helped draw up a list of the region's main values (table 1). This list was added to at each seminar. Then, at Marne-la-Vallée and Tunis (we did not get that far at Rabat), we moved on to a second vote[23] to rank the remaining values (three choices per person, table 2), by responding to the following question: "In 2030, which values could be common to the whole of the Mediterranean population, i.e. for which essential values would inhabitants be prepared to get out into the streets to defend, from Zagreb to Paris to Casablanca?"

Access to knowledge and the freedom to circulate are the two leading values of the Euro-Mediterranean invisible contract, according to participants at the Marne-la-Vallée seminar. In Tunis (where most voters were Tunisian), as in Marne-la-Vallée, the freedom to circulate, good governance (including political and union freedoms) and access to knowledge were all in the leading group. There were two differences from Marne-la-Vallée: a lower score for sustainable management of natural resources and a strong leaning towards a hitherto unidentified value: "tolerance and respect".

It is easy to see the operation's plus points (the mobilizing aspect) and limitations (meaningfulness of the sample, approximation of categories). The categories need to be refined and the exercise repeated in other countries in the region and within professional circles. The operation should also be reiterated in order to check whether preferences identified here are truly stable, or whether others emerge.

In particular, we might ask ourselves whether the notion of "general security" might regroup some of the preferences included in the first phase of the questionnaire and constitute a mobilizing preference. The multiplication of fears (global marginalization, climate change, insecurity, food shortages, quality of medicines, illegal migration, etc.) might lend a broader, more mobilizing meaning to the notion of security. Which is another hypothesis to be tested.

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[23] Those present at the previous seminar did not take part in the vote to avoid double counting.

Table 1. Starting list of common values on both sides of the Mediterranean

Positive values	Repellent values, fears
Freedom of opinion	Censorship
Freedom of movement	"Apartheid"
Collective security, peace	War
Food security	Malnutrition
Cultural heritage	Trivialisation
Natural heritage	Degradation
Family solidarity between generations	Selfishness, individualism
Sustainable management of resources	Depredation
Access to water	Water conflict
Quality of life	Degradation of life
Economic competitiveness	Marginalisation within globalisation
Access to employment	Social exclusion
Respect for standards and rule of law	Unlawfulness
Good governance	Inefficiency
Access to knowledge	Obscurantism
Access to information	Manipulation of opinion
Common production of knowledge	Cognitive divergence
Innovation	Lagging behind
Access to care	Illness, short life expectancy
Justice	Injustice
Social equality, fair division of the fruits of growth	Inequality
Equality of the sexes	Subjugation of women
Dignity and respect for peoples, tolerance	Intolerance
Dialogue among civilisations	Reciprocal ignorance, contempt
North-South solidarity	North-South divergence, development rift

Source: participants at the "Mediterranean 2030" seminar, 25 June 2009, Marne-la-Vallée (Stratorg method)

Table 2. Vote (number of votes) ranking common values on both sides of the Mediterranean

Marne-la-Vallée (25 June 2009):

1. Access to knowledge and technologies useful for development	11
2. Freedom of movement for people	10
3. Sustainable management of natural resources and development	9
4. Political freedom and good governance	8
5. Access to employment	5
6. Solidarity, justice, fight against poverty	5
7. Mediterranean civilisation and culture	4
8. Food security and quality of Mediterranean food	3
9. Wellbeing, quality of life	3
10. Equality of the sexes	1

Tunis (21 November 2009):

1. Freedom of movement for people	9
2. Tolerance, respect	9
3. Access to education, knowledge and technologies useful for development	8
4. Political freedom, (unions), social responsibility, good governance (participation etc.)	8
5. Solidarity, justice, fight against poverty	7
6. Mediterranean civilisation and culture	3
7. Food security and quality of Mediterranean food	3
8. Equality of the sexes	3
9. Sustainable management of natural resources and development	2
10. Access to employment	2
11. Wellbeing, quality of life	2
12. Communication, social cohesion	1
13. Family solidarity and between generations	1
14. Openness to others and sharing	1
15. Equal opportunities	1

Source: participants at the "Mediterranean 2030" seminars (Stratorg method)

Appendices

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">Appendix 1
1a. Members of the Med 2030 programme working group on "Values"</td></tr>
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1d. Participants at the Rabat seminar (24 February 2010)

[

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Social life in traditional Tunisian society was based on the primacy of community values. An individual's allegiance to his or her community (e.g. tribe, clan, parental family or extended family) was almost unconditional. This model is no longer as noticeable, although personal values do not yet overshadow community values. Modernity, which in the West has been built on personal freedom in relation to society, has not had such a marking effect on Tunisian society. To what extent do community values subsist?

All of the surveys of young people (at least four) made by the Tunisian National Youth Observatory, the Ministry for Public Health, the Ministry for Economic Development, and the National Office for the Family and the Population clearly show that young Tunisians consider family values to be a priority. The parental family is always put in second place, coming either after health or finance.

Friendship, which is a vital value in western societies, only receives a score of 39% in comparison to 62% for family relationships. Professional relationships are developing but do not overshadow family relationships, which still form the substance of Tunisian social life. The Tunisian family plays a centripetal force on its members. Even though individuals revolt against their families and keep away from them at times, they always end up returning to the fold.

Another indicator of family solidarity is the protection of the elderly, who still grow old living within their families. The act of placing ageing parents in a home is inconceivable for Tunisians and even considered dishonourable and likely to incur social reprobation. There are only 11 old peoples' homes in Tunisia housing 700 pensioners, around half of whom lived in exclusion before they were given shelter (e.g. beggars, alcoholics, tramps, etc.) and most of whom have no solid family ties: 44% are elderly bachelors and 83.3% have no children.

We consider that this family solidarity has advantages and disadvantages: it clearly protects individuals against the hazards of life but also to a certain extent prevents them from becoming autonomous. Young unemployed people from the middle and well-off classes are almost totally paid for by their families, with the effect that they are in no hurry to look for work and only accept the best jobs. On the other hand, young unemployed people from impoverished classes, who are less protected and more resourceful, accept insecure jobs while they wait for a better offer.

The importance of family values also explains the large number of small family businesses in Tunisia (around 90% of all companies), which allows family members to find jobs and makes their bonds tighter still, yet with numerous downsides: little supervision, low recruitment rates for graduates, a lack of interest in scientific development research and technological innovation and the limited development of products and services.

Nevertheless and despite their importance, family values have evolved, and several mutations are noteworthy: firstly, total cohabitation along the lines of the old refrain "same pot, same oven, same bread" has almost disappeared: 80% of families in Tunisia are nuclear and 90% of Tunisian families do not cohabit.

It goes without saying that this total cohabitation is always a source of conflict and tension between generations: it draws them physically closer but pushes them further apart emotionally. The most virulent conflicts are between daughter-in-laws and mother-in-laws. The latter tyrannize the former with accusations of laziness, bad housekeeping and neglecting their husbands, etc. However, cohabitation has taken a more healthy form: residential proximity. According to the National Institute for Public Health, 88% of children whose parents are 65 or over live just a few minutes' away from their parents' homes (often in the same neighbourhood or the next floor up, etc.). Only a minority (5.3%) live at least an hour away from their parental home.

Following the same order of ideas, in other words the evolution of family values, we have mentioned several results from our work in our publication on ageing in Tunisian society (Paris, L'Harmattan, 2003). These results are linked to relationships between the elderly and younger

generations and more particularly young peoples' attitudes: respect for parents but less parental invasion into young peoples' personal and love lives, family solidarity but greater personal conjugal autonomy, and communication with elders but more dialogue and less obedience.

In traditional Tunisian society, being older was enough to confer rights of supervision. This supervision, which signifies authority, protection, and initiation to social and professional life, was founded on a single experience: "one more night is enough to make a man more sensible than you are", goes an old Tunisian proverb. But gerontocratic supervision has lost its influence: being older no longer confers more, and birthright by age has moved on. Merit is linked to current value, independent of age. Sometimes relationships even take on a new, original meaning: we are seeing the professional experience of older generations becoming obsolete in comparison with the skills of younger generations, especially in information technology and communication. In this area, and perhaps in others, parents are becoming dependent on their children, a historical learning role reversal and an eloquent indicator of change.

The second value axis that is undergoing rapid developments is consumerism: the values of a traditional Tunisian society that was constantly confronted with financial insecurity and was more skilled in managing scarcity than abundance was rooted in moral and psychological imperatives adapted to circumstance like the Kana'a (the virtue of being happy with little), austerity, simplicity, moderate consumption, etc. These values are currently being given a pounding by the new consumer society, which sees consumption as a mark of social success, leading to its conspicuousness. Dignity is no longer to be found in pure and simple subsistence, nor in satisfying one's vital needs, but in participating in wellbeing and the joys of modern comforts, which explains why Tunisian families are so in debt.

The third and last axis of values and the last to be analyzed relates to openness to others. In traditional society, three features characterized Tunisians in their relationships with others. Firstly, their identity-based withdrawal as a refuge and resistance against the occupier and a defence mechanism against any veiled attempt at assimilation. Then, monogamy as a form of recognition and integration into the original community; and autarky as economic isolation to tackle the invasion of foreign goods considered as a threat to local economies.

This situation has radically changed. Most Tunisians remain attached to their Arab-Muslim identity, but are ready to learn from other cultures and civilizations. The desire to emigrate to a certain extent provides a response to this need to know other people and communicate with them. Monogamy has been abandoned, not only because it is suspect or dangerous, but because it drastically reduces the world of exchanges and personal and social enrichment. The already fragile economic autarky has given in to the assaults of national and international trade, especially with globalization.

In conclusion, we can say that there has been an evolution of Tunisian values but not a revolution. Most Tunisians identify with both traditional values and new ones, in other words, they are neither closed-in conservatives nor die-hard revolutionaries. Yet can this balance between tradition and modernity resist the test of rapid global developments encouraged by information and communication technologies. Will it go in one direction or the other? Only the coming years shall tell.

The first national survey of values undertaken by Moroccan researchers in 2004 was part of the report made to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the country's independence. The sample comprises over 1,000 respondents, spread throughout the kingdom's 14 regions. There are about 100 questions in the survey covering the following areas: family, religion and traditions, politics, work and leisure. The main conclusions drawn are as follows:

- The family bond remains the most valued. However, there are changes linked to the process of individualism and autonomy of family members. The nuclear family is developing, as is the autonomy of couples and children in the choice of partner.

- The relationship to religion shows a tendency to become more anonymous, personal and direct, in other words, it is moving away from traditional institutional mediation. Free access to information encourages personal autonomy and so more diverse and heterogeneous values. These factors make way for personal choices and solutions that result in potential or actual tensions such as postures for prayer and visits to sanctuaries, etc.

- Although the religious bond is valued, in remains largely informal with little supervision by religious bodies (e.g. brotherhoods and associations). This leaves ample room for putting together and improvising, and even anomy, when it comes to religious values.

- Social bonds in general are torn between religious and non-religious considerations. Depending on the context, coeducation, tolerance and personal identity, which are all ways of forming a bond with others, are based on beliefs that are at times religious, at times secular. Most people support mixed genders at school but not at the beach.

- The political bond is the weakest. This is shown by the low membership of political organizations. This weak bond is linked to the inconsistency of the political culture. The high rate of responses expressing no opinion in this domain could partly be due to the evanescence of a national public opinion.

- Moroccans, especially the young, are less and less likely to form their attitudes and values from their immediate environment (family, school, national media, etc.). Their influences for values in general and religious values in particular go beyond national borders.

- The immediate consequence of this globalization of information is the recent diversification of ways in which values are circulated. The menu of values, which is not just local, has become more varied, heterogeneous and contentious. It facilitates an anonymous, personal and direct choice, i.e. without any personal mediation such as from a father or teacher. Free access to information encourages personal autonomy and consequently reinforces the diversity and heterogeneity of values.

- Some traditional values (e.g. marital obedience, corporal punishment of children and polygamy) are clearly opposed to modern values (e.g. dialogue, autonomy of the couple). However, in some cases, attachment to the family and marriage and the development of solidarity and confidence are neither more modern nor more traditional. It all depends on the nature of the motivation (religious, secular, sociological or other) that justifies them and gives them meaning. This implies that the solidity of a social bond is not necessarily related to the modern or traditional content of the values that found it.

Appendix 4
A few thoughts on the Euromed process and **sharing common values between North and South**
Working paper for IPEMED's Political Patronage Committee Abderrahmane Hadj-Nacer, co-president of the Political Patronage Committee, 15 March 2010

Fifteen years after the 1995 Barcelona Summit, most observers and experts admit that the rapprochement of the two sides of the Mediterranean has not delivered the results anticipated. Economic convergence, for example, remains insufficient, since, despite substantial performances from Southern economies, the Mediterranean Sea still separates two zones that are largely unequal in terms of prosperity, human development and the respect of basic rights.

The object of this paper is not to take stock of what is often referred to as "Euromed". Numerous academic works already do so, and IPEMED is currently writing up a summary of the most accomplished research on the matter. Yet we need to ask ourselves why, fifteen years on, Euromed is at a standstill.

Political governance in the South: one of the reasons for the deadlock

Among the frequent (and acceptable) arguments, the comment that insufficient financial resources are allocated to countries in the South and East Mediterranean (SEMCs) comes back time and again, in particular when resources are compared to the structural funds given to central and eastern European countries that recently joined the European Union. Although they do not refute this preferential treatment, several studies have underlined that financial resources exist in the South and East Mediterranean, but that there is a problem in mobilizing and using them correctly to see through long-term projects. Moreover, apart from the issue of European financial aid, southern Mediterranean countries' tendency to go it alone is often given as one of the reasons for Euromed's difficulties.

The best illustration can be found in the Maghreb, whose regional grouping, the Arab Maghreb Union, has broken down. It is difficult to imagine that a regional economic force might get going when SEMCs still balk at trading with each other. The themes of insufficient European aid and SEMCs division are well known and provide unending material for the many symposiums around the Mediterranean.

Other potential causes are analyzed more rarely but more carefully. One of these is the political governance of SEMCs. A simple analysis of current affairs in the region or a look at reports written by non-governmental organizations specializing in human rights, show that governance in these countries has much progress to make on respecting personal freedoms. Such freedoms condition the capacity of local economic operators to take initiatives and help develop their country, and make it possible for elites living abroad to invest in their home country or even move (back) there. This type of governance also creates problems for foreign investors, who need things to be visible and foreseeable in the future: a legitimate demand to which the far-from-perfect political systems are incapable of satisfactorily responding.

However, in its approach to the South and East, the European Union claims that it is primarily the development of economic links – stimulated by the creation of a free trade zone – that will regulate matters and that thanks to these links, the countries concerned will end up slotting into a kind of vicious circle leading from market to democracy. On their side, SEMC governments insist on the specific nature of their countries, histories and cultures, and only accept Europe's point of view on their capacity to reform and upgrade their economies. This uncompromising position can explain why the final project of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has focused on economic projects.

Reflecting on "political upgrade"

The question that now arises – always keeping an analysis of Euromed's failure at the forefront – is whether it might be time to think about the political aspects of a rapprochement between the European Union and SEMCs. Is it because the "political upgrade" aspect has been neglected – or

purposefully under-estimated – that the Barcelona process is at a standstill and that southern and eastern Mediterranean countries still rank so low in terms of human development? Before answering, we must first accept that this is an acceptable question and so recognize its relevance.

In fact, reflection on the question of a link between political governance in SEMCs and the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean rapprochement process must start by tackling the following point: must we, or can we, consider that southern and eastern Mediterranean countries need a form of governance that is basically comparable to that of EU countries? Put another way, the preliminary thought process could take this form: Do inhabitants in the South and East Mediterranean share the same values as their homologues in the North, which would encourage them to hope for a form of political governance close to that existing in the European Union?

We might of course answer this last question with a "no" – a point of view often heard in discourses designed to preserve or justify the political status quo in the North and East Mediterranean. It is also what people are trying to defend when they esteem that the West possesses the only values that they judge to be universal. By emphasizing differences in culture and religion, we show that inhabitants in the South are essentially different from those in the North and that it would be misleading to claim that they wish for political governance comparable to that existing in Europe. "Culturalism" and "differentialism" feed this line of defence, which currently dominates. Following a vain attempt to reflect on values common to both sides of the Mediterranean – an approach initiated by the European Commissioner of the time, Manuel Marin – the European Union, or at least the Commission, prefers to avoid the issue.

Elections are a good illustration of the gap between the European Union's ambition for some of its neighbours in the East and those in the South Mediterranean. You only have to think of the large numbers of observers mobilized by the EU when voting takes place in the Ukraine or Georgia and compare it with the symbolic handful of representatives sent to cover presidential elections in Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt. Another, even more striking example is coups d'état. Over recent months, Africa seems to have gone back to its old demons of military coups throwing over democratically elected presidents. In most cases, Europe has made timid protests and accepted the new situation. "Real politik" say some, "A desire not to let China or the USA reinforce their positions in the countries in question," say others: none of which is new. We know that the emergence of strong powers can seem like a lesser evil in a hugely unstable zone. But what will be the long-term effects?

Helping elites in the South and East Mediterranean

What are the issues involved when reflecting on values common to European countries and SEMCs? The answer is simple: following the thought process through, Europe would be led to admit that themes like respect for personal freedom, freedom of expression, the right to property, the right to security and the "right to a state under the rule of law" are not marginal aspirations in the South and East Mediterranean and that, on the contrary, they are unavoidable pre-requisites for the success of economic reforms and for anchoring SEMCs to the European Union. It would be beneficial for European elites to finally admit that that their SEMC homologues share these convictions.

It is worth analyzing the question of elites in these countries and Europe's ambiguous position in relation to them. We need to understand that the gap between the discourse made by Arabic elites – who defend freedoms – and Arab leaders in power who restrict them, has ended by delegitimizing the role of these same elites in the eyes of their peoples. Simply put, the more Europe dithers, the more it encourages local cultural integration and the more it weakens the very elites who are capable of encouraging the success of major regional projects like Euromed or the Union for the Mediterranean.

There is nothing new in this gap between the discourse of elites and the realities of those living in Arabic countries. Even in colonial times, elites in the South had already understood that to acquire basic rights, their peoples needed access to citizenship. And when this seemed near at hand, the reaction of colonial powers was to grant independence; yet rather than entrusting it to the legitimate elites, they chose leaders from amongst the army. The political career and fate of Ferhat Abbaas perfectly illustrate this historical fact.

The rising phenomenon of Franco-North African bi-nationals must be examined against this need for basic rights. For many North Africans, to become a citizen of France or elsewhere (the UK,

Canada, etc.) is to gain access to the "right to have rights", and to feel protected by clear laws that, officially at least, avoid acts of state, arbitrary decisions and the abuse of power. It would not be surprising if, over the coming years, protest movements develop within these Franco-North African diasporas in relation to their countries of origin, similar to the Etoile nord-Africaine for North African nationalism in the 1920s and 30s.

The Turkish example

When expressing their views on their country's candidature for the European Union, Turkish business leaders and numerous intellectuals tend to say that the "membership process counts more than membership". This expression is not just a joke meant to put into perspective all the past and future difficulties of their candidature. It also sums up the fact that many of the Turkish elite are aware of the positive effects of the criteria for membership imposed by Europe. These criteria create a permanent pressure that pulls Turkey upwards and obliges it to constantly modernize. This modernization is obviously economic and financial. But it is also political.

It may seem surprising or even shocking, but it is certainly mainly thanks to Europe and its membership criteria, the most recent of which date from Copenhagen, that the Turkish army have remained in their barracks and not been tempted to carry out the type of coup they made in the 1980s. A situation that gets many elites in the Mediterranean South thinking! After all, this "positive pressure" that Europe has over Turkey is not unknown in SEMCs. Carefully applied, it even constitutes a benchmark, or a comparison tool, to appraise what Europe expects. Perhaps it is time for this "positive conditionality" to also be applied to SEMCs for the good of their institutions and governance systems.

1. Economy: difficult access to European markets and diversified poles of attraction

1.1. From Maghreb to Mashriq, different poles of attraction

1.1.1. The Mashriq countries: economically and culturally close to the much richer countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), where:

- all qualities of goods and services find a market thanks to the diverse origins of resident populations and the wealth gap between richest and the poorest;
- market sizes are considerable given the size of resident populations (very high demographic growth rate) and average purchasing power;
- rates of economic growth and low numbers of indigenous inhabitants allow for massive emigration;
- coexistence of traditional trades and sophisticated trades (oil, bank, top-end real estate) makes it possible to absorb people with all types and levels of qualification.

We can therefore talk of Mashriq countries' increasing alliance to the development pole represented by GCC countries, a fact that is overlooked by IPEMED's "Mediterranean 2030" report by Guillaume Alméras and Cécile Jolly. To an even greater extent, the GCC's increasing control of national interests means that the Mashriq is already very caught up in the "neo-colonial" scenario envisaged by the report.

1.1.2. The Maghreb countries: behind them are the Sahara and Sub-Saharan Africa, which are poor and underdeveloped; above them is Europe, their only potential partner (even though they trade with the rest of the world). Added to which is linguistic proximity yet low cultural proximity with the countries of the Mashriq and the GCC.

1.2. Hard-to-access European markets

1.2.1. For agricultural produce

Apart from a few known factors like low competitiveness, low counter-seasonality and lack of market knowledge, other factors are hard to pick up:

- A limited technical side that rules out respect of European health standards. These standards are particularly demanding, and individual EU27 member states can make them harder in relation to a common reference point, which is in itself stricter than the FAO's Codex Alimentarius. Today you have to be a farmer from South-Africa, California or New Zealand to export to Europe!
- The individual logistics of exporters, which are costly and inefficient. There are no collective logistics for establishing warehouses close to markets in order to minimize the time and cost of deliveries.

1.2.2. For services

- Banking services: weak banking sectors (in size and technical capacity, except for the Lebanon), established presence of European banks that drain local savings towards Europe and organize emigrants' remittances; competitiveness and technical capacities of European banks, preventing local banks from gaining an effective foothold in Europe.
- Tourism services: low South-North tourist flows make it hard for Southern companies to develop; well-established North-South tourism organized by European giants. These large companies create competition in the South, even for local actors, and set them in competition with each other when they select local partners, adding two obstacles to growth for Southern companies.
- IT services: competition from very low-cost countries like India.

2. Growing cultural gap

2.1. In the Mashriq (including Egypt)

Political instability generated by the Israeli conflict has led to: the overthrow of traditional political elites, accused of inefficiency and collusion with the great powers; the appearance of populist nationalist regimes; and the departure of professional and intellectual elites who used to provide a relay with Europe because they had frequented each other for years and attended education systems set up by European countries from the 19th century. This political instability has also led to the departure of European communities who had often been living in the Mashriq for a long time (Greeks, Italians, French or Maltese) and who provided even more direct intermediaries between Europe and the Mashriq.

A general drop in the level of culture and a return to more traditional lifestyles has ensued. The new regimes and their elites have turned towards countries with less ambition or no colonial past, i.e. the Soviet Union, United States (despite its support for Israel), and the United Kingdom for former French colonies (strong pro-British trend in the Lebanon in the 40s and 50s). The low attraction of the Soviet Union and easy access to American "culture" and lifestyle (especially easy learning of English) have been additional factors separating local inhabitants from their partners of the previous era, firstly culturally and then consequently in their commercial relations. Apart from the United States and China, the main partners are now Italy and Germany, two countries unmarked by colonial pasts and ambitions.

It is important to point out that although the English language is used in trade between Euro-Mediterranean countries, the lack of knowledge of others' languages – and so cultures – rules out any genuine rapprochement. The use of English puts European partners on the same level as other commercial partners.

2.2. In the Maghreb (except Libya)

The situation is different in the Maghreb. It is culturally closer to Europe as a result of its longer colonial period. Traditional elites were overthrown following independence struggles and not following the Arab-Israeli conflict. These battles are now in the distant past, although instability is still apparent in the Mashriq, where the Arab-Israeli conflict continues, leading to more radicalization and a greater rejection of the West and Europe in particular. It is true that this radicalization also affects some areas of Maghrebi society, but not enough to prompt the elites in power to deny a French cultural heritage that is much more deeply rooted than it is in the Mashriq. Europe, via France, still possesses some powerful cultural relays in this part of the Mediterranean, which work in favour of a rapprochement with Europe, which is not the case in the Mashriq. The development of economic relations with Italy and Germany, which have no colonial past or ambitions, gives these countries a chance to move away from the former coloniser and yet remain commercially close to Europe.

3. Rejection of the European social model

The European social model, which is perceived as founded on values of individualism, remains unattractive despite the social guarantees it brings. The South prefers to ensure social wellbeing through solidarity within the community, clans and families, rather than through mechanisms that isolate the individual in the face of a guardian-state. People appreciate that the state provides certain guarantees, but would be unwilling to entrust it with every aspect of social protection.

This rejection of the European social model has the effect of distancing Mashriq inhabitants from Europeans and brings them closer to their Arabic environment and their American partner, perceived to be more traditionalist than Europe.

4. Political rejection of former colonial powers, nationalist policies towards neighbours

The incapacity of these countries to politically, militarily and economically confront their former colonizer and European countries in general, provokes a reaction of avoidance and rejection because the relationship is a strong reminder of the countries' under-development and past history of domination. It has also led practically every significantly sized country in the South and East Mediterranean to develop its own form of nationalism in the face of weaker, less-developed

neighbours: Egypt towards Sudan and the Yemen (in the 1960s) and Europe (the 1956 war and afterwards), Syria towards the Lebanon, Morocco towards the Western Sahara, Libya towards Chad, Iraq towards Kuwait, Saudi Arabia towards Yemen, etc. The low levels of development attained by local economies, which are insufficient to move them into higher markets, rule out intra-branch trade and increase competitiveness between countries, maintaining strong nationalist tensions and protectionist reflexes.

This brings us back to the Mediterranean conflict scenario evoked in the Alméras-Jolly report, which seems more likely than a relationship of cooperation between South-East countries or between these same countries and Europe.

Adieu Beyrouth
méditerranéenne!

Après le génocide architectural et archéologique pratiqué par Solidere, voici le temps des démolitions des vieux immeubles de Ras Beyrouth et d'Achrafié pour construire les «tours» de bétons et de vitres. Déjà, les vieilles demeures patriciennes de notre capitale ou les petits immeubles modestes en pierre, avec des arcades gracieuses et des toits de tuile, avaient commencé à disparaître dès les années soixante du siècle dernier. Palmiers, acacias et autres végétations luxuriantes, familiers de tout paysage méditerranéen traditionnel, se sont faits de plus en plus rares. Aujourd'hui, tout est remplacé par ces tours au style architectural moderne et monotone, typique de Dubaï ou Abou Dhabi ou Qatar, style lui-même inspiré de l'évolution de l'architecture des villes des Etats-Unis en bordure de l'Atlantique ou du Pacifique.

Dans la zone que s'est appropriée Solidere, le nom des rues est devenu celui des grandes avenues de New York et le nom des tours rappelle celui des beaux immeubles de la capitale d'affaires des Etats-Unis. Cependant que les nouveaux «souks» de Beyrouth ne sont qu'une énorme farce, n'étant qu'un simple «mall» de magasins modernes, comme il en existe partout aux Etats-Unis ou dans les pays arabes pétroliers. En réalité, irrémédiablement Beyrouth perd tous les jours un peu plus son caractère de ville méditerranéenne pour ressembler aux «villes de sel»[1] des monarchies et émirats pétroliers de la péninsule arabique. Notre économie est d'ailleurs de plus en plus dépendante de la conjoncture pétrolière et des investissements fonciers ou bancaires des ressortissants de ces riches principautés ou de nos émigrés faisant fortune là-bas. Comme si un mouvement de plaques tectoniques souterraines aboutissait à éloigner le Liban et sa capitale de la Méditerranée pour l'arrimer de plus en plus solidement à la péninsule arabique, à ses modes de consommation, à ses niveaux de vie, à ses comportements et ses mœurs.

Peut-être que la nouvelle génération de Libanais, celle qui n'a pas connu le Liban d'antan et les vrais souks du centre historique de sa capitale, trouve-t-elle cette évolution fort à son goût; après tout, Beyrouth s'est alignée sur le style architectural américano-saoudien qui domine la péninsule arabique. Pourquoi ne pas devenir un appendice de la formidable prospérité pétrolière qui enrichit tant de gens? Pourquoi ne pas vivre comme à New York ou au rond-point de la Défense à Paris, ou comme à Dallas? Faut-il s'accrocher à un Liban disparu pour toute la nouvelle génération de jeunes Libanais et pourquoi dénoncer un Liban de la prospérité traduite en tours de béton de luxe, comme il en existe partout?

La réponse facile est bien d'accepter les faits accomplis et irrémédiables. Mais la réponse réfléchie consistera à se demander au préalable qu'elle sera désormais l'originalité architecturale de notre capitale, reflétant sa spécificité culturelle et sa richesse humaine. Si la locomotive de la globalisation pétrolière qui a affecté la péninsule arabique doit nous passer sur le corps ici aussi, qu'elle sera alors encore notre raison d'être Libanais, plutôt que Saoudien ou Qatari ou Koweitien ou Dubaïote, par les mœurs sinon par la nationalité?

Notre visage arabe avait été jusqu'ici celui de notre participation plus qu'active à la renaissance de la langue et des lettres arabes, au dialogue des cultures et des valeurs avec l'Occident conquérant, voire notre appui aux luttes de libération nationale des peuples arabes voisins. Ne sera-t-il plus demain que celui d'une arabité de la fortune matérielle, de l'investissement dans le foncier de luxe, d'une forte religiosité à but ostentatoire, comme le symbolise si bien la gigantesque nouvelle mosquée de l'ancienne Place des Martyrs, place historique qui disparaît tous les jours un peu plus, peuplée désormais exclusivement d'immeubles de grand luxe?

Mais peut-être que notre jeunesse n'est même plus à même de se poser un tel problème. Ceux qui émigrent aux Etats-Unis, au Canada ou en Europe et Australie ont fait le choix d'une vie plus digne. Ceux qui émigrent au Golfe espèrent la fortune rapide. Ceux qui restent sont divisés entre familles très aisées et familles très pauvres. Ni les unes ni les autres, pour des raisons opposées, n'ont la possibilité effective de réfléchir au destin de notre culture et de notre identité. Cessons donc de penser, de critiquer, d'être des esprits chagrins: vous verrez tout ira bien mieux! ∎

1- Titre du très beau roman en trois volumes de l'écrivain bien connu, al-Taïeb Saleh, qui décrit l'émergence du phénomène pétrolier dans la péninsule arabique, autrefois pauvre et bédouine.

DR

List of acronyms used

AMU: Arab Maghreb Union
ARI: Arab Reform Initiative
CEAP: Centre d'Etudes Appliquées et de Prospective
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
IMES: Institute for Migration & Ethnic Studies (Croatia)
IRES: Institut Royal d'Etudes Stratégiques
ITES: Institut Tunisien d'Etudes Stratégiques
MAED: Ministry for Economic Affairs and Development (Mauritania)
SEMCs: Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries